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PROCEDURAL NOTE CLARIFYING THE RECORD REGARDING
DUPLICATE MEMORANDUM TITLES

The record in this matter contains two documents identically titled "Plaintiffs Response
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" (R. Vol. II, p. 384-400), one filed on December
6, 2012, and the other filed on March 5, 2013. (R. Vol. III, p. 577-601). The initial brief was

I
I
I

withdrawn and substituted with the latter. (R. Vol. I, p. 5, L. 5).
The initial brief was filed as a result of the Respondent attempting to have their Summary
Judgment Motion heard before discovery could be conducted. This effort was denied by the trial
court and discovery was allowed. After information was provided from the City, the Northern
Idaho Building Contractors Association then substituted the initial brief with a more thorough
and relevant response brief on March 15, 2013. The initial brief adds nothing of substance to the
argument but the parties could not reach an agreement to remove it from the record, therefore

i

this statement is provided to avoid confusion as to which brief is applicable.

I
I
I

iii

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

The Appellant in this case 1s the North Idaho Building Contractors Association
(hereinafter "NIBCA"), a trade association of local home builders and small businesses who are
dedicated to keeping home ownership affordable. The Respondent is the City of Hayden, Idaho.

I
I
I
-I

This case is before the Supreme Court of Idaho to resolve the issue of whether or not a
municipality may bypass the traditional infrastructure funding mechanisms and pay for the
expansion of a new sewer system through mandatory "Capitalization Fees." The subject of the
suit is a fee that is not related to any current sewer system, but instead is to be used to fund the
construction of a new $20 million expanded system into the City of Hayden's area of impact. (R.
Aug., p. 0023). NIBCA maintains that, based upon Idaho Code and the litany of cases
interpreting municipal authority, the law prohibits levying fees to raise revenue and/or pay for

I

expansion into future use areas.

I
I
I

interpretation, citing to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and Idaho's user fee statutes as authority for

The Respondent, the City of Hayden, has a differing

their fee. The City's logic is flawed in that neither of these statutes allow the use of a fee for
expans10n.
B. Proceedings Below and Standard Upon Appeal

This case was decided in the lower court in part through Summary Judgment and

I

I

thereafter through a Stipulation amongst the parties.
In an appeal from an order for summary judgment, the Com1's standard of review is the
same standard as that used by the district court in entering a motion for summary judgment.

Major v. Security Equipment Corp., 155 Idaho 199 (2013). Entry of summary judgment is
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,
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i
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of such non-moving party. Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 851 (2011). The Respondent
was the party moving for Summary Judgment, therefore all inferences are to be drawn in favor of
NIBCA.

I
I

C. Concise Statement of Facts
The factual issues in this case are generally not in dispute; rather, it is the application of
the law where the parties disagree. It is undisputed that the City charges two fees in relation to its
sewer system: one fee for the maintenance, operation, and replacement of the current system, and
a separate fee used to fund future expansion. Hayden calls their maintenance and operation fee a

i
,,...

I

I
I
I

"bi-monthly fee" and the expansion fee a "capitalization fee." (R. Vol. III, p. 641 ,i 3). The bimonthly fee is not at issue in this case.
The City also admits that the monies collected under the guise of the capitalization fees
are planned to be used exclusively for future expansion. (R. Vol. I, p. 80). The City plans to use
the capitalization fee to pay for its plan to bring sewer services out into virtually every part of the
City's area of impact.
The lower court did find "significant disputed facts regarding the allocation and
expenditure of funds collected from the city's capitalization fee." (R. Vol. III, p. 654

1 2).

However, the parties resolved these issues after the court's partial Summary Judgment decision.

(R. Vol. III, p. 669-673).

i

I

Additionally, there is no factual dispute as to how the fees are collected; all parties agree
they are mandatory fees imposed when one applies for a building permit within the city. The
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City will not issue a building permit without payment of the capitalization fee and all other fees
levied by the City. (R. Aug., p. 0038 1 2).

It is also undisputed that the City's Sewer Capitalization Fee was assessed in 2001 at
$580.00 per residential unit or its equivalent.

The fee then increased in 2005 to $737.00,

increased again in 2006 to $774.00, and yet again on June 7, 2007 to $2,280.00, a roughly 195%

i
I
I

increase. (R. Vol. III, p. 636 ,r 1).
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Did the court err in ruling that the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code § 50-1027 et
seq., authorizes municipalities to collect sewer system "connection fees," which are to be
solely used to pay for future expansion?
2. Did the court err in ruling that Idaho Code § 63-1311 authorizes municipalities to collect

I
I

sewer system "user fees," which are to be solely used to pay for future expansion?
III.

ARGUMENT

A. Introduction

I
I
I

This Court is being asked to uphold an illegal fee as a valid and appropriate way to fund
future expansion and growth.

In Idaho, cities can fund infrastructure growth through the

issuance of bonds or through the implementation of Impact Fees. Idaho has enacted a very clear
statutory scheme for cities to raise money for infrastructure necessitated by future growth
pursuant to the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code § 67-8201 et seq.
The IDIF A contains very clear checks and balances so as to prevent a city from extracting an
arbitrary amount from its citizens. However, by circumventing the IDIF A, the city of Hayden is
doing exactly that and charging its arbitrary fee under the ruse of a user fee or an equity buy-in
fee. Respondent cites the authority granted under Idaho Code§ 63-1311 (user fees) and Idaho
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Code § 50-1027 (equity buy-in fee) as justification for the City's capitalization fee.

The

difficulty with Respondent's argument, as illustrated herein, is that when the facts are applied to
the case law interpreting these statutes it becomes apparent that there is no authority for the fee
they have imposed.

In addition to the capitalization fee, the city of Hayden also imposes a significant impact
fee and a bi-monthly sewer user fee, neither of which the Builders have challenged in this

I
I

litigation.
B. Background of Unlawful Fee - No Relation to Current System

In March, 2006, the Respondent engaged an engineering and surveyor firm, Welch
Comer & Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "Welch Comer"), to a report pertaining to the City of
Hayden's Sewer Master Plan.

This report calculates a fee which expands and implements

Respondent's sewer master plan layout to service the entirety of Respondent's defined area of

I

I
II
•

I
I

I

impact.

Even the report itself calls the City's vision an "'ambitious $20 million capital

improvement plan." (R. Aug., p. 0041 ,I 13.5.2). When this $20 million infrastructure expansion
is fully implemented, Respondent will have sewer services reaching out into areas not even
closely associated with any current or perceived development. See for example Welch Comer
report page 2, page 17, and page 29-30. (R. Aug., p. 0008; p. 0023; p. 0034-0035).
On June 7, 2007, Respondent raised its self-defined "sewer capitalization fee" from
$774.00 to $2,280.00 based solely on the analysis and report prepared by Welch Corner. (R. Vol.
I, p. 114-15 ,i 29). The raise in the "sewage capitalization fee" was to be used for "capital
improvements needed to serve new growth, and updated cost and build-out projections." Id.
Despite the City's ordinance labeling this a "capitalization fee," counsel for Respondent
repeatedly uses the term "capacity replacement." This phraseology is counsel's cleverly worded
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term for expansion. It is clear that Respondent is just trying to justify expanding their system
since this "replacement" theory is not supported by the Welch Comer report, which does not use
the term "replacement," nor does it give any consideration to the current capacity of the system
when calculating the fee. As stated supra in the Welch Comer report"[i]n order to finance this
ambitious $20 million capital improvement plan, it is recommended that the City increase the

I
I
I

sewer collection system capitalization fee." (R. Aug., p. 0041 ,I 13.5.2). The report exposes how
the sewage capitalization fee was really calculated by taking the capital improvement plan total
of $20,4 I 6,900.00 and dividing it by the arbitrarily projected potential future population of
Respondent. Id. Incidentally, there is no basis for the growth projection in the report. Welch
Comer's report simply used numbers fed to it by the City. (R. Aug., p. 0023 ,I 6.1).
C. The City's fee is not tied to the buy-in of a current system, but is used exclusively
to raise revenue and therefore is not an equity buy-in fee.

The Idaho Revenue Bond Act in Title 50 of the Idaho Code authorizes the assessment of

I

I
I
I

equity buy-in fees under the following conditions:
[Any] city shall have the power under and subject to the following
provisions ... To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges,
including the levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or
charges against governmental units, departments or agencies,
including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services,
facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide
methods of collections and penalties, including denial of service
for nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges.
LC. § 50-1030(f) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 50-1028 prohibits municipalities from
operating works under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act as a primary source of revenue to the city.
The term "works" is defined as, "water systems, drainage systems, sewerage systems, recreation
facilities, off-street parking facilities, airport facilities and air navigation facilities, electric
systems or any of them as herein defined." LC.§ 50-1029(a).
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1. Loomis provides a framework for municipalities to charge a lawful "equity
buy-in" fee to a consumer connecting to an existing sewage system.

Respondent's fee does not stand up to this scrutiny.
In Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434 ( 1991 ), the Court considered and refined the
"equity buy-in" theory of charging connection fees under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. An
"equity buy-in" fee is based upon "the replacement value minus the remaining bond principal
II

I

and cumulative unfunded depreciation." Id. at 436. This equity buy-in formula "allows the new

I
I

user to buy into the [existing] system at the current dollar value [of the user's portion the
system]." Id.
In further assessing the legality of the fee at issue in Loomis, this Court stated that the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the collection of sewer connection fees. The Court made it
clear that if the fees collected pursuant to the Act are allocated and budgeted in conformity with
that Act, they will not be construed as taxes. Id. at 439. In this regard, this Court has held that

I

"a municipality may accumulate collected revenues from rates, charges or fees to fund the cost of
replacement of system components in its public works projects which are ordina,y and

I
I
I

necessary" Id. at 440 (emphasis added); Idaho Const. Art. 8, § 3. The Loomis court went on to
provide examples of expenses held not to be ordinary and necessary, such as "new construction
or the purchase of new equipment or facilities" that stand in contrast to the "repair, partial
replacement or reconditioning of existing facilities," which the Court found were ordinary and
necessary. Id. (quotingAsson v. City or Burley, 105 Idaho 432,441 (1983)).
The leading case in distinguishing whether an expense is "ordinary and necessary" is City

of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1 (2006). In Frazier, the Court held that the expansion of the City
of Boise's airport's parking facility, although crucial to the operation of the airport, was
nevertheless not an "ordinary and necessary" expense because the expansion could neither be
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i
considered repair or maintenance. Id. at 5. Nor could it be "necessary," as the City could not cite
a crisis, or even immediacy, regarding the expansion to be constructed within the next year; or, at
today's build out rates, even over the next decade. Id. As a corollary, the Welch Corner report
does not even state a projected date that the City could reach the projected population that would
necessitate this new expansive sewer system.

i

I

I
I
i
I
I

I
I
I

Given the formula used by Respondent to establish its sewage capitalization fee, the fee
cannot be considered an equity buy-in. No portion of the fee is used for maintenance, repair, or
upkeep of the existing system (the City has a bi-monthly fee to cover that), and the fee has no
relation to the value of the existing system. It was calculated by considering the cost of Hayden's
"wish list" of future capital improvements and dividing it by the number of future users the
future system may someday serve. Its sole purpose is to raise revenues for the future expansion
of Respondent's sewer system.
2. The lower court's reliance on Viking was in error, as it is distinguishable
from Respondent's sewage capitalization fee because the Idaho Revenue
Bond Act prohibits operating works primarily as a source of revenue.

The lower court and the Respondent assert that the holding in Viking Construction v.
Hayden Lake Irrigation District, 149 Idaho 187 (2010), authorizes Respondent to assess its
sewage capitalization fee without regard to the existing sewage system's value or the lack of
equity calculations. In Viking, the Hayden Lake Irrigation District charged a fee to connect to its
domestic water distribution system. Id. at 190. A portion of the connection fee covered the actual

i

cost of c01mecting to the water system, but the majority of the fee was intended to be the cost of
buying an equity interest in the system. Id. The Viking court held that a portion of this fee may
also be used "to provide a reserve for improvements to their works." Id. at 197 (citing LC.§ 43-
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1912(e) ). It would be difficult from the plain meaning of "improvement" to consider a $20
million assessment used to triple the system capacity as an "improvement."
In addition, the most important precedent articulated in Viking is that the taxing district
must base all equity buy-in fees upon specific factual findings and calculations:

I
I

I
I

However, for the connection fee to be an equity buy-in, it must be based
upon some calculation designed to determine the value of that portion of
the system that the new user will be utilizing. If there is no attempt to
calculate in some manner that value, then the connection fee is not an
equity buy-in regardless of its label.
Id. at 194. The facts of the case at hand are also notably different than those presented in

Viking especially in one distinct way: The Viking case involved a fee that was intended to be the
cost of buying an equity interest in the existing system, whereas Respondent's sewer
capitalization fee is solely intended as a revenue raising mechanism to provide funding for
capital expenses for the community in the future. Respondent's study focuses on funding "capital

i

I
I
I

improvements that must be replaced, enlarged or reconfigured so that system capacity continues
to be available for future users." (R. Vol. I, p. 114 ,i 26) (emphasis added). By Respondent's
own admission, Respondent's study is not based on "the value of that portion of the system that
the new user will be utilizing" as required by Viking, but rather is a revenue raising mechanism
to perform capacity expansion projects.
Thus, although there may have been an incidental collection of fees reserved for
improvement of the system in Viking, Respondent's sewage capitalization fee is assessed solely
as a revenue raising mechanism. Under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, municipalities are
prohibited from operating works primarily as a source of revenue to the city, which is exactly
what Respondent is doing. Just because that revenue is earmarked to build future sewer works,
as opposed to street or other works, does not save the illega1 fee.
NIBCA APPELLANT BRIEF - PAGE 8

D. The City's fee is not related to any service being rendered and therefore is not a
user fee.

-I

1. City's capitalization fee is not a user fee.

The City's tries to justify its capitalization fee citing support from Idaho Code§ 63-1311,
which allows municipalities to charge a fee for the use of a particular service (a "user fee"). The

I
I
I

lower court also used this Code section to uphold Respondent's fee:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the governing board
of any taxing district may impose and cause to be collected fees for
those services provided by that which would otherwise be funded
by property tax. The fees collected pursuant to this section shall
be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of
the service being rendered.
LC. § 63-1311 (I) (emphasis added). There is a well-developed body of case law
interpreting the above cited section of Code. These cases have produced tests to aid in analyzing
whether or not a fee is a permissible user fee, or if it is merely a disguised tax. The tests look to

I

I
I
I

the relationship and cost between the fee and the service being provided.
This Court considered a fee very similar to Respondent's fee in the case of Brewster v.
City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502 (1988). In this case, this Court was analyzing a "street fee"
imposed upon property owners. The Court found that "the revenue to be collected from
Pocatello's street fee has no necessary relationship to the regulation of travel over its streets, but
rather is to generate funds for the non-regulatory function of repairing and maintaining streets."

Id. at 504. Further, the Court stated "[i]n a general sense, a fee is a charge for a direct public
service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at
large to meet public needs." Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
As demonstrated supra, for the City's fee to withstand the scrutiny under the tests
established in Brewster, the City needs to attribute the fee back to a service being provided. The
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City absolutely cannot meet this test. As mentioned previously, the fee imposed was derived
directly from the Welch Comer Report. The Welch Comer report did not consider the cost or the
remaining capacity of the existing system whatsoever when setting the fee; it merely looked into
the City's wish list of building a $20 million infrastructure into undeveloped areas of impact. (R.
Aug., p. 0041-0042). The City argues that the fee is for a "system capacity replacement cost." (R.

a

I

Vol. I, p. 71-107). The lower court also bought into this argument. (R. Vol. III, p. 643).

I
I

However, there are no facts to back up the City's creative labe]ing of this fee.
The capitalization fee at issue stands in stark contrast to the City's "bi-monthly" fee. The
bi-monthly fee actually is a user fee; it provides money for the maintenance, operation and
replacement of the current sewer system:

I
I
I
I

There is hereby established a system of periodic service charges
and fees in order to equitably impose upon all users of public
sewerage systems the cost and expenses of maintenance, operation,
replacement and other expenditures of this sewerage system. Said
services charges and fees for purposes of computation shall be
based upon: (a) the volume and contact of the fluent discharged
into the sewerage system of the city; and (b) the actual and
expected costs and expenses of maintenance, operation,
replacement, upgrading and repair of the sewerage system, such
charges and fees being determined to be the benefit derived by
each building, structure or user of the collector system and regional
facility.
Hayden City Code 8-1-4. As one can see from the plain language of the ordinance, this
fee is directly tied to the actual' and expected costs and expenses of maintenance, operation,
replacement, upgrading, and repair of the sewer system services rendered directly to the
customer. Thus, the bi-monthly fee is a pennissible user fee. Monies from that user fee maintain
the collector pipes, the mains, and the lift stations, all of which are being currently used by the
customers who pay the fee for its maintenance. A customer paying this fee benefits directly by
discharging its sewer into the system, which is obviously a direct benefit.

i
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It is hard to see how any customer in the currently developed area of the city would
receive any benefit from proposed collector pipes, mains, and lift stations located out in the far
reaches of the city's area of impact, where there is currently little-to-no development.
The lower court believed that Respondent's fee was a user fee based upon its analysis of
Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136 (1990) and Kootenai Property Owners Association v.

i

I
I

Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676 (1989), discussed infra. As demonstrated below, the lower

court's analysis under these cases is in error.
2. Alpert v. Boise Water Corp. distinguished.
Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., supra, is a franchise fee case and does not pertain to the

same area of law present in this case. Even Respondent realized the distinction in prior briefing:
"[T]hat exaction by the city is legitimate not because it is a user fee, but for reasons unique to
franchises that have no bearing on the present litigation." City's Opening Brief in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. Aug., p. 0041-0042). Nevertheless, the dicta Respondent

I
I
I

relies upon refutes its argument more than bolstering it:
"As noted in Brewster, the providing of sewer, water, electrical
and other utility services to residents based on consumption of the
commodity is a charge for a direct public service as compared to a
tax which is a forced contribution by the public-at-large for
revenue raising purposes."
Alpert, 118 Idaho at 145 (emphasis added). Respondent's fee makes no attempt to link to

a payer's consumption in the current system. Rather, the fee is calculated based on the estimated
costs for future capital improvement projects to Respondent's sewer system divided by the
estimated amount of future users. (R. Aug., p. 0041-0042). The fee goes to fund projects that
are in no way associated with the payer. Instead, the revenues are used to fund projects located

i

throughout the city that will be used to expand the capacity of the city's sewer system that will
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I

I

benefit future system users. It is undisputed that Respondent's "sewer capitalization fee" raises
revenues that are used exclusively on capital improvement projects. Deposition of Stefan
Chatwin, pages 28:17 through 29:9 (R. Volume III, p. 574).
Respondent's fee is strictly a revenue raising measure to raise funds to expand the
existing sewage system to provide infrastructure that is of a common benefit to the community

I
I
I

and therefore, it is a tax. The Welch Comer report recognized this to be a tax, even stating "these
elements of the City's sanitary sewer system are considered infrastructure, which is of a common
benefit to the community." (R. Aug., p. 0040 ,r 1).
3. Kootenai Property Owners Association is inapplicable to the case at hand.

Respondent convinced the lower court that Kootenai County Owners Assn. v. Kootenai
County, supra, justified its fee. However, the Court and Respondent inappropriately rely on this

case, as the Kootenai County Court was not considering or applying Idaho Code § 63-1311.
Rather, the Court applied a completely different statute, Idaho Code § 31-4403, which pertains to

I
I
I

landfill sites and gives the commissioners a statutory duty to "acquire sites." Kootenai County,
115 Idaho at 678-679. Further, the Court explained that "[t]he basis upon which the ordinance
in Brewster was overturned - that it lacked specific legislative authorization - is not present
here." Id. at 680.
Respondent argued before the trial court that the authorization in Idaho Code § 631311 (1) is even broader than the one that was sufficient to uphold the user fee in Kootenai
County Owners Association. (R. Vol. III, p.6141 5). On the contrary, Idaho Code§ 63-1311(1)

only pennits charging a fee that is "reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of
the service being rendered." As established supra, Hayden's fee is based on the costs of a series
of future capital improvement projects and has no reasonable relation to the services being
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rendered to the current particular consumer. Were Respondent's interpretation of Idaho Code §
63-1311 (1) to be adopted, there would be no such thing as an impermissible fee, since
municipalities would be allowed to charge any fee they desired so long as it was loosely tied to
some government function. Such an interpretation is quite contrary to the Court's holding in
Brewster and all other case law applicable to municipal taxing authority.

I
I
I

Respondent's capitalization fee fails when analyzed against the test established in
Brewster that asks if the fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to a particular

customer. The fee is only tied directly to a future sewer system envisioned by the City, which the
current customer cannot even use. The fee is a tax used to meet the needs of the public at large
and is thus impermissible.

IV.

REQUEST FOR COSTS

NIBCA does not request attorney's fees, but requests an award of costs incurred in this
appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40.

V.

I
I
I-

I
I
I
I
I

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, NIBCA respectfully requests this Court void the City's illegal fee as it has
no basis in Idaho law, either as an equity buy-in fee or a user fee.

Respectfully submitted this 1th day of April, 2014.
RISCH + PISCA, PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant, North Idaho Building
Contractors Association
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